

# Rebranding Russia: Norms, Politics and Power

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## Abstract

This working paper argues that Russia is in the process of re-branding itself internationally, with a variety of normative arguments increasingly creeping into its wider international discourse. By appealing to norms, Russia tries to reformulate the key messages it sends to the world and implant the concept of its power worldwide. Yet given that Russia's normative messages are often met with scarce enthusiasm in Europe, it is of utmost importance to uncover how the normative segment in Russian foreign policy is perceived, evaluated and debated both inside Russia and elsewhere. Within this framework, this paper focuses on a set of case studies highlighting the normative and non-normative dimensions of Russian foreign policy. These include Russia-EU trans-border cooperation, Moscow's policies towards Estonia, Poland, Ukraine/Georgia and the UK, Russian strategies in the 'war on terror' and energy issues.

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# Contents

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1. Introduction .....	1
2. Norms, normativity, normalcy: Russia in search of its identity .....	4
2.1 Normative intended: Russia-EU trans-border cooperation, 1990s- .....	4
2.2 Normative unintended: Russia's policy towards Estonia, 2007- .....	8
2.3 Realpolitik intended: Russia's policy towards Poland, 2004- .....	11
2.4 Realpolitik unintended: Russia's policy towards the 'colour revolutions', 2003- .....	13
2.5 Imperial intended: Russia's war on terror, 2001- .....	17
2.6 Imperial unintended: the Russian-British dispute over the "Litvinenko case", 2006 ..	20
2.7 Status quo intended: Russia's policy in Kaliningrad, 2000- .....	21
2.8 Status quo unintended: Russia's energy policy, 2006- .....	26
3. Comparing the cases by way of conclusion .....	29
References .....	32

# REBRANDING RUSSIA: NORMS, POLITICS AND POWER

ANDREY S.MAKARYCHEV \*

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## 1. Introduction

There are two different ways in which norms can be operationalised in international relations. On the one hand, ‘norms tame’ and de-politicise power (Adler, 2005, p. 173), when they are viewed as indisputable, essential and universal, thus invoking a managerial type of behaviour that leaves no space for political discretion. Norms under this interpretation represent “collective understandings of the proper behaviour of actors” (Legro, 1997, p. 33). The Foucauldian legacy looms large in this interpretation: the norm is viewed as a bearer of power claims, the core element needed to substantiate and legitimise the execution of power. According to Foucault (1999), the norm both qualifies and corrects, thus representing a “positive technique of intervention and reformation”. Therefore, the reification of the norm signifies its gradual endorsement by a group, and the failure to accept the norm is equated with a pathology or deviation. The norm becomes a principle of conformity, which is contrasted with irregularity, disorder or eccentricity. On the other hand, norms may be viewed as political instruments. Since norms construct agents, including states, they perform a political function and enhance political subjectivity by differentiating between US (the followers of norms) and Them (the violators of norms). We identify ourselves (and thus our norms) by identifying others (those unfit or unwilling to follow our norms). The normative appeal is increasingly marked by a frontier separating the inside from the outside, a frontier between those who succeed in remaining within normative boundaries and those excluded from them (Zizek, 2006, p. 21).

Normativity ought to be understood also as an inter-subjective concept. As Jurgen Habermas (2006, p. 18) argues: “in the course of mutual perspective taking, a common horizon of background assumptions can develop in which both sides reach an interpretation that is neither ethno-centrally condescending nor a conversion, but something intersubjectively shared”. Inter-subjectivity is a core characteristic of normativity, while also having close bearings to the concept of identity. This points to one of the most important sources of discursive asymmetry between the EU and Russia. It is argued that a European identity is constructed in opposition to its own past through the concept of the “past as other” (Diez, 2005). This differs radically from the Russian perception of itself as a country whose identity is deeply rooted in its past. Another identity-driven juxtaposition between the EU and Russia is the Russian concept of ‘False Europe’, which includes countries with strong anti-Russian sentiments and countries that have presumably lost touch with ‘genuine European values’; while ‘true Europe’ includes countries friendly to Russia, which adhere to what Russia considers as ‘the original spirit of Europe’. This highlights how “for reality to be brought under the ordering influence of governance, it first has to be divided ... into what is imagined to be normal and what is deviant, threatening, risky, underdeveloped, etc. Such a narration of abnormality, ‘othering’... is constitutive of any project of improvement...” (Merlingen, 2006, p. 192). In other words, the norm violator is crucial to a proper understanding of the norm itself. This explains why the concept of otherness is so closely linked with the manifestation of normativity in politics.

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Hence, one cannot properly define a norm without defining its exception, and this involves bordering effects and a conceptualisation of the Other as a challenger to the norm, a bearer of radical alterity. The Other takes different forms, depending on context: for the EU it can be personalised in Lukashenko's regime in Belarus, while for Russia it can take the form of the Estonian government, which is believed to deviate from European norms of tolerance and remembrance of the Second World War. What is then needed is to link norms with their exceptions: “[i]f we distinguish contemporary exceptions as the limit and threshold of the norm, we can investigate how the one constitutes the other and vice versa”.<sup>1</sup> It may be argued that “the exception gobbles up the normal case and becomes, in and of itself, the ordinary, general rule... It is the exception that defines the norm, not vice versa. The exception is primary to the norm and defines and informs the norm” (Gross, 2000, p. 1843). This approach offers an alternative explanation of the construction of international agents. When we speak of exception(s), there should be a clear reference to – and analytical distinction from – its logical opposite: the norm. In this reading, the concept of exception unveils strong connotations with Carl Schmitt's theory, which suggests that all norm-bound orders depend on a decision-making capacity that falls beyond the given structure of rules and principles. Exceptions as specific exercises of power are actualised when “no prior law, procedure or anticipated response is adequate. It is a perilous moment that exceeds the limits of precedent, knowledge, legislation and predictability... an expression of political authority that has the capacity to constitute new political and legal orders” (CASE, 2006, p. 465). Following Schmitt (1996, p. 53): “one can say that the exceptional case has an especially decisive meaning which exposes the core of the matter”.

The extension of the concept of exception to the sphere of international relations is justified. In particular, the deployment of the ‘norm-exception’ dichotomy in the relationship between Moscow and Brussels presupposes the unpacking of what may be dubbed as ‘recognition games’. Presumably, Russia (as well as the EU) utilises both norm-based and exception-based arguments to strengthen its international credentials and negotiating positions. The Russian message sent to Europe is thus ambivalent. On the one hand, Moscow recognises the force and potential of the ‘policy of exceptions’ and takes as much advantage of it as possible. On certain occasions, it becomes the exception (e.g., Russia's unwillingness to ratify the Energy Charter), while in other situations it calls upon EU member states to recognise the need for exceptions (e.g., Russian demands that the EU would not apply the *acquis communautaire* to Kaliningrad). On the other hand, Russia explores the possibilities embedded in adhering to what is considered as ‘normal’ by the EU. This gap between norm-based and exception-based policies constitutes a major dilemma in the contested construction of Russia's European identity.

This ambivalence in the concept of the norm – its ability to both politicise and de-politicise action – fuels debate. In this working paper, based upon the methodology offered by Nathalie Tocci (2007), the debate over the meaning of norms plays out in different ways. Since norms require at least two parties in order to be operational (either ‘subject-subject’ or ‘subject-object’), three model situations can be imagined, which reflect the case studies analysed in this paper and are selected on the basis of Tocci's conceptual framework:

- the encounter of two norms in their de-politicised version, which relates to the normative intended case study: Russia-EU trans-border cooperation,
- the collision of two politically driven approaches to norms, which relates to the normative unintended case study: Russia-Estonia,

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<sup>1</sup> Review of the literature on the ‘state of exception’ and the application of this concept to contemporary politics, <http://www.libertysecurity.org/article169.html>

- a situation in which one actor adheres to a de-politicised norm while the other is inclined to use a politicised approach, which relates to the imperial unintended case study: the Russia-UK dispute over Litvinenko's murder.

A similar split between politicized and de-politicized interpretations of norms is found in case studies in which goals are 'non-normative': the Realpolitik and Status Quo cases discussed below. The difference between the two is substantial. In the Realpolitik scenarios, 'non-normative approaches' tend to be linked to politicised moves, consisting either of opportunistically transgressing the emerging political order or clashing with established rules of the game (i.e., the cases of Russia's policy towards the colour revolutions and Poland). The Status Quo scenarios (i.e., the cases of Kaliningrad and energy policy) instead presuppose the competitive co-existence of different yet more de-politicised norms. However, within the scope of these de-politicised cases, there is still scope for strongly politicised effects if one of the parties behaves as a norm violator rather than a legitimate competitor of norms. The same is true in cases in which there is an 'encounter of two de-politicised norms': the same type of politicising effects might be expected if one side adopts a political reading of the situation by making reference either to exceptionality or to the 'Self-Other' framework. This is possible particularly in the case of Kaliningrad, which is formally part of Russia proper (and could thus shift from being a Status Quo intended to being a Normative Intended case).

There are three further methodological observations to be made at the outset. First, my analysis is predicated upon a logical link between structural ('goals-means-results' triad) and conditioning ('internal interests, internal capacity, external environment' triad) factors as discussed by Tocci (2007). More specifically, this paper assumes that a) internal interests condition the articulation of an actor's goals, b) internal capacity conditions an actor's choice of means, and c) the external environment conditions the policy impact (see Table 1). Taking these correlations into account, one may posit that conditioning factors: a) explain the goals articulated, the means chosen and the results attained; b) add dynamics into each element of the triad; and c) broaden the overall picture by including explanatory elements to comprehend the three core variables.

*Table 1. The correlation between Normative Action and Conditioning Factors*

	<b>Internal Interests</b>	<b>Internal Capacity</b>	<b>External Environment</b>
<b>Goals</b>			
<b>Means</b>			
<b>Impact</b>			

Second, I do not equate the 'intended-unintended' dichotomy to 'success-failure'. In cases of intended outcomes, Russia displays an ability to achieve and control the results of its policies. In cases of unintended outcomes, Russia is unable to attain its desired results or fails to control the impact of its policies due to a multiplicity of external/structural factors.

Third, while norms may differ, the core question, in my understanding, is whether a certain country (in this case Russia) is in principle committed to (any) norms as opposed to pursuing self-interest through conquest, force or possession. The norm in this sense is understood more as a logical category that might – or might not – be reduced to specific and substantive values, principles and rules. We are thus not comparing the ethical and moral content of different norms, but rather an actor's adherence to norms as opposed to other models of foreign policy conduct.

## 2. Norms, normativity, normalcy: Russia in search of its identity

The concept of the norm – as well as its derivatives like normativity or normalcy – might be used to analyse Russia’s foreign policy, although there is a great deal of confusion concerning the operationalisation of these concepts. Since post-Soviet foreign policy is still in the making, its normative aspects are often encoded in other arguments, including geopolitical, economic or security ones. President Putin’s discourses often shift between different spheres, testifying to the fact that treating Russia as a black-and-white realpolitik actor is a gross oversimplification. Russia is in the process of rebranding itself internationally, with a normative appeal inscribed into a wider set of discourses. Normative arguments have become a tool for the reformulation of Russia’s messages to the world, while being embedded in Russia’s understanding of its international power. Russian attempts to utilise norms in foreign policy discourse are often met with scepticism in the EU. In the case of energy policy, Russia’s references to economic and financial norms are considered as inherently political/imperial moves by the EU. In the conflict with Estonia, Moscow’s references to common European values are considered as a gesture to conceal imperial designs and an attempted return to Soviet-style international conduct. Despite these doubts and preconceptions, as the sections below exemplify, Russia’s foreign policy is varied, changing according to a variety of internal and external factors. It is thus of utmost importance to uncover how the normative dimension of Russian foreign policy discourse is perceived, assessed, evaluated and debated. Table 2 below summarises the selected case studies.

Table 2. *Russia’s Role in the World: Selected Sub-Case Studies*

Type of actor	Normative		Realpolitik		Imperial		Status Quo	
	Intended	Unintended	Intended	Unintended	Intended	Unintended	Intended	Unintended
Case Study	Trans-border cooperation	Estonia	Poland	Colour revolutions	War on terror	Litvinenko	Kaliningrad	Energy
Goals								
Means								
Impact								

### 2.1 Normative intended: Russia-EU trans-border cooperation, 1990s-

Russia displays its commitment to normative foreign policy through its participation in a series of trans-border initiatives aimed at fostering cooperation with Europe, including the Northern Dimension and the construction of Euroregions.

#### Goals

In developing trans-border communications with its European neighbours, Russia is driven by its identification with European norms and feels involved in European affairs. Of course, one cannot discard Russia’s meaningful economic interests in trans-border cooperation, but the normative basis driving policy seems to prevail. The membership of border regions in international initiatives, including the development of twin-city partnerships, is an important element of Russia’s Europeanisation and Russia has committed itself to strengthening institutions in this shared neighbourhood through a variety of initiatives aimed at promoting

mutual confidence and human exchange. This normative background becomes clearer when contrasted with the absence of comparable cooperation initiatives in border regions with China, Mongolia or Kazakhstan, which do not have the same normative appeal in Russia as Europe does.

In particular in the Northern Dimension (ND), Russia has participated in region-building efforts which either skipped traditional East-West divides or made them less divisive. It was important for Russia that the Baltic and Nordic regions were formed without an overall plan or superior authority, and with no strict criteria for membership, which made Russia's voice in the endeavour stronger. The ND was meant to shift Russia's policies in this part of Europe from realpolitik, semi-isolationism and unilateralism to multilateral cooperation. By participating in trans-national region-building projects, Russia helped to elevate regionality into a core principle of the political construction of Europe's margins. At the same time, Russia perceived the ND as an opportunity to join the 'democratic space', in which the main priorities are human rights, the protection of minorities and a healthy environment (Arutinov, 2000, p. 259). The creation of the Nordic and Baltic regions also opened new and inclusive channels of dialogue with EU non-member states. Russia was granted the status of being 'one of us', a potential partner which could feel at home in Baltic and Nordic initiatives (Joenniemi, 1999, p. 75). A good illustration of this is the interpretation of the ND by many Russian analysts: "the Nordic game can only be played effectively within the EU framework... The Nordic challenge is therefore not to compete with the EU, but to utilize the Union's structural framework; not to alter but to extend the European project" (Medvedev, 1998, p. 247).

### *Means*

Russia has pursued normative goals in its trans-border cooperation with the EU through normative policy means, including a set of cooperative agreements with the EU. In 2001 Russia approved the Concept of Trans-border Cooperation, which mentioned the need to take into account the peculiarities of Russia's border regions.<sup>2</sup> In 2002, the State Duma ratified the European Framework Convention on Trans-Border Cooperation. Thereafter, the Doctrine of the Development of Russia's North West stipulated that for integration into a European milieu, Russia's border regions needed special managerial techniques based on human capital, the innovation and non-governmental networking.<sup>3</sup> Beyond these legal frameworks, Russian regions used a variety of trans-border organisations like the Council on Cooperation of Border Regions (CCBR) to seek ways out of cumbersome state-to-state interaction. In the Barents Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC), the regions (along with states) are the dominant actors to discuss non-military problems for example (Tunander, 1994, pp. 31-33). Useful institutional resources are also found in the Committee for Spatial Development in the Baltic Sea Region (CSD/BSR), which contributed to the elaboration of norms in housing, sanitation, public services, the exploitation of non-renewable resources, the preservation of cultural heritage, the safety of technical supplies, the regulation of land use, etc. Institutional mechanisms were also established for circumpolar integration such as the Arctic Council, a high-level intergovernmental forum which includes Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia and Sweden as members.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> «O kontseptsii prigranichnogo sotrudnichestva v Rossiiskoi Federatsii». Press release of the Russian government (N 183, February 13, 2001).

<sup>3</sup> Center for Strategic Design of the North West Federal District web site, <http://www.csr-nw.ru/strategy.php>

<sup>4</sup> *Antarctic Treaty XXIV Consultative Meeting*, St. Petersburg, 9-20 July 2001, at [http://www.arctic-council.org/arctic\\_antarctic.asp](http://www.arctic-council.org/arctic_antarctic.asp)

A particular manifestation of Russia's receptiveness to the EU's normative appeal was its participation in the ND, which is closely related to the idea of Europe as a set of 'Olympic rings'. The political values that underpin the ND are "transparency, egalitarianism, and consensual democracy" (Schumacher, 2000, p. 11), fostering decentralised arrangements and leaving ample space for grass-root initiatives. The ND assumes that a political space can be heterogeneous and autonomous, with a variety of growth poles; its components being active agents in regional integration and not simply subjects of someone else's policies. The ensuing dialogue between different actors facilitates cultural exchanges and undermines 'self/other' constructions. In this sense, the ND was meant to blur the distinction between insiders and outsiders, because it is defined not only in geographical but also in normative terms.

### *Impact*

By and large, Russia reacted positively to EU trans-border initiatives, engendering a normative impact. Local communities and professional groups were particularly enthusiastic, stimulating leading regional institutions, shaping networks between the most active and knowledgeable NGOs, expanding the scope of issues being dealt with, and encouraging the creation of multiple overlapping networks ('network of networks'). Russia attained a normative effect in several spheres. In social terms, a key effect was the cultivation of a space of close interaction by creating normative practices that bridged gaps between communities as well as facilities aimed at promoting tourist exchange, business-to-business contacts, etc. In security terms, the trans-border cooperation altered the balance of priorities between hard and soft security issues, raising awareness of issues such as depopulation and labour migration, or the poaching of precious stones, non-ferrous metals, furs, wood and oil products. Hence, whereas the federal state has played up more the importance of geopolitics and hard security; the regional level has prioritised more soft security, highlighting the human and public policy dimension of security (Tkachenko, 2002). In institutional terms, an increasing number of issues (e.g., pollution, water purification, health care, civil servants' training) are tackled in a technical, politically neutral and low-profile way through regional institutions. This has generated incentives to create and follow new norms of governance. Russian regional officials have started thinking of how to reorient their strategies towards providing better services, more effective marketing and richer public debates about future living conditions.<sup>5</sup> Several institutional arrangements in Russia have started acting as "trans-boundary networking communities" (Shinkunas, 2003), allowing for deeper involvement of European business in regional economies, and the proliferation of trademarks, commercial brands, banking services, insurance companies, consulting firms, and trans-border programmes aimed at job creation and educational exchanges. The effects are multiple: expansion of the social scope of beneficiaries of EU programmes; increased investments in human capital; fostering accountability and transparency of local bureaucracies; the identification and promotion of groups committed to pluralism; and greater compatibility with EU norms.

But what explains Russia's normative foreign policy in trans-border cooperation with the EU, as well as the evident normative impact of this policy choice?

### *Internal context*

A first variable determining Russia's normative foreign policy in its northwest neighbourhood is the interplay between different levels of government in Russia, leaving a void that has been readily filled by EU normative approaches. There has been a collision of two different

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<sup>5</sup> *Spatial Planning for Sustainable Development in the Baltic Sea Region*. A VASAB 2010 Contribution to Baltic 21, at <http://www.ee/baltic21/publicat/R9.htm>



approaches in Russia to trans-border relations. A first approach – dominant in 1990s – was based on the interpretation of Russia’s European choice as a policy of re-building Russian domestic rules under the influence of EU trans-border programmes. This approach was (and still is) promoted by regional elites eager to ‘go international’ and profit from their proximity to the EU. Sub-national units bordering the EU contributed to cooperative efforts aimed at linking Russia to the European milieu. Consequently, borders were considered as contact zones offering incentives rather than posing security threats. The ND was conceptualised by these actors as an intermediary between core powers: the EU and Russia. Russian border regions would benefit from this desecuritized, depoliticised and inclusive understanding of regionalism, as well as from ‘policy transfer networks’ that would foster the transnational diffusion of information, ideas and social practices through travel, media, twinning and people diplomacy. Most of these approaches explicitly favour liberal solutions for border territories, including drastic limitations of bureaucratic interference in business (Kuznetsova & Mau, 2002, pp. 71-72). A second and far more conservative approach gained momentum in the last decade, and has been articulated mainly by federal agencies. “The Rules of Border Regime” issued by the Federal Security Service in September 2006 reflects this more conservative spirit. This document has significantly complicated the procedure for entering and restricted social and economic activities in Russia’s border areas.<sup>6</sup> As an effect of the collision of these two approaches, Russia has failed to elaborate a clear set of policy instruments in the Baltic and Northern regions, granting the EU greater leeway to set the policy/normative agenda.

### *Internal capabilities*

Internal capabilities have instead hindered Russia’s pursuit of a normative foreign policy. The major problem here has been the lack of long-term strategic thinking by regional elites,<sup>7</sup> an argument confirmed by a recent study of the Moscow Carnegie Center (2001). European observers usually complain about the lack of financial transparency in collaborative projects with Russia; inadequate and imprecise information provided by regional authorities, and weak control over environmental and energy matters. Another domestic factor impeding trans-border cooperation is the spread of nationalist ideas within border regional elites.<sup>8</sup>

### *External environment*

The last and most important factor explaining Russia’s normative policy in its northwest border regions is the external environment. A strong normative pull from the EU coupled with internally divided Russian approaches to border regions balanced against weak internal capabilities, leading to an overall normative result. The EU was highly favourable to the external activities of Russia’s sub-national units, especially in the 1990s. In developing trans-border cooperation, Russia has been – softly and indirectly – bound by EU norms derived mainly from the *acquis*, which has been “used to varying degrees as both models and yardsticks” (Haukkala, 2005, p. 6). The EU’s pull has been particularly effective in trans-border cooperation, which sees the involvement of a variety of regional governing agencies open to external influences (Friis & Murphy, 1998, p. 16). A key example highlighting the importance

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<sup>6</sup> *Rossiiskaya gazeta*, November 22, 2006.

<sup>7</sup> Center for Strategic Design web site, <http://www.csr-nw.ru/text.php?item=publications&code=298>

<sup>8</sup> For instance, the former governor of Pskov Oblast, Mikhailov has a strongly imperial approach. In the mid-1990s he wrote a book entitled “The burden of the imperial nation”, in which he articulated his views on how Russia has to repel “the threat coming from the south”. It is significant that in the 1990s the Pskov Oblast gained the reputation of a fertile ground for politicians with ‘national patriotic’ inclinations seeking electoral legitimacy.

of the external milieu is the ‘Northern discourse’, which emerged in Russia’s Northwest as a clear reflection of European discourses on the Norden. Very much like the Nordic debate in Europe, the concept of the North in Russia down-played the division between East and West, seeing a compromise between globalisation (i.e., a new world order based on a Northern way of life/ or a ‘Northern variant of globalisation’) and regionalisation (i.e., inclusive trans-border cooperation and federalist ideas of multi-confessionality and poly-ethnicity). In line with Scandinavian and North European cultural traditions, Russia’s northern discourse presented the region as a territory to be managed in concert by free peoples who would strengthen their social bonds by working together.

## 2.2 Normative unintended: Russia’s policy towards Estonia, 2007-

Russia’s policy towards Estonia serves as a good illustration of a rupture between the pursuit of normative goals and means, and the lack of normative results. This case covers the events of 2007 when the Russian-Estonian conflict was re-ignited by the incident over the Second World War memorial in Tallinn.

### *Goals*

In its policy towards Estonia, Russia highlights two normative landmarks and attempts to present itself as a country that firmly defends ‘true European values’, which are allegedly challenged by Tallinn. The first normative principle is the unequivocal international condemnation of Nazism/fascism, which Moscow fears is being challenged by the association by some Estonian elites of the historical roles of Germany and the Soviet Union during the Second World War. Second, Russia advocates minority protection standards, expressing its deep dissatisfaction with Estonia’s denial of electoral rights to significant parts of its Russian-speaking community. In view of these two normative shortcomings, Moscow argues that Estonia cannot be viewed as a fully-fledged democracy. This position was expressed more vocally when Estonia attempted to re-write the script of the Second World War. In this context, Russia accused Estonia of failing to acknowledge the exceptional contribution of the Soviet Union in defeating Nazi Germany and liberating the Baltic countries and Eastern Europe from Nazism. Estonian symbolic gestures aimed at equating the roles of Hitler and Stalin or revisiting the Second World War have been met with unconcealed irritation by Moscow, which has charged the alleged intention of ‘New Europe’ with misrepresenting and corrupting the original European idea.

### *Means*

Russia’s reaction to Estonia’s revisionism has been expressed through largely normative means. First, Russia has appealed to the EU to ‘tame’ Estonia as one of its newcomers. In its statement of 22 October 2004, the State Duma declared that in the aftermath of EU accession, Latvia and Estonia had aired their anti-Russian attitudes by launching several initiatives aimed at advancing material and political claims to Russia, as well as reconsidering the outcomes of the Second World War.<sup>9</sup> Sergey Yastrzhembskii (2007), President Putin’s aide on European affairs, accused EU newcomers of displaying “fairly primitive Russophobia” and trying to “complicate the dialogue between Russia and the EU”, against the interests of “old residents” in the EU. Second, Russia has exerted pressure on Estonia through negative media campaigns and public demonstrations. Finally and least normatively, Russia has used economic leverage. Russia’s first vice premier Sergei Ivanov suggested Russians abstain from purchasing Estonian goods

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<sup>9</sup> *Strana.ru*, October 10, 2004.

and travelling to Estonia.<sup>10</sup> In some stores, Estonian goods were either marked or sold at drastically reduced prices.<sup>11</sup> While some of these measures cannot be dubbed as being perfectly normative, Russia did not succumb to the temptation of using overtly non-normative means such as military pressure or official sanctions,<sup>12</sup> in response to what Moscow considered a grave attack on its international reputation and standing.

### *Impact*

Vis-à-vis Estonia, Russia has failed to achieve normative results: the state of political relations between Moscow and Tallinn is characterised by increasing alienation and tug-of-war, most recently exacerbated by Estonia's decision to remove the monument erected to Soviet Soldiers from Tallinn. Russia was unable to block similar actions taken by local authorities in Bauska, Latvia in August 2007. Despite Russian pleas, the EU was sympathetic to the Estonian government. One of the indirect results of this crisis was Russia's heightened concern with history. Russia has upgraded the treatment of Second World War monuments by Eastern/Central European authorities onto the list of criteria used to assess the state of bilateral relations. Positive examples in this respect are Austria and Slovakia, which, much to Russia's liking, have demonstrated sensitivity to the graves of Russian soldiers killed during the Second World War. The negative attitude by Estonia (as well as Poland) instead has allowed Russia to discursively identify itself with 'true European values' including the observance of minority rights and the condemnation of fascism in contrast to Tallinn's behaviour.

Yet not only has Russia failed to engender a normative impact in relations with Estonia, Moscow's reliance on history as a measure of amity/enmity with third states is extremely vulnerable for three reasons. First, Russia's own treatment of Second World War monuments and the socio-economic treatment of war veterans is far from satisfactory. Second, Russia has been unable to garner meaningful support from CIS countries in its confrontation with Estonia, illustrating Russia's weak normative appeal in its 'near abroad'. Third, drawing on history plays into another divisive debate within Russia: that of Russia's own identity. In the dispute over the Second World War monuments, Russia has positioned itself as the successor of the Soviet Union. Yet in other instances, Russia's articulation of its identity draws on different historical legacies. An interesting example of this confusion relates to an incident that took place in Odessa, Ukraine, in August 2007, when the municipal authorities removed the monument to 'Potiomkin' sailors (an emblem of Russia's revolutionary past) and replaced it with a monument to Katherine the Second (a symbol of Russia's imperial tradition), leaving Moscow at a loss as to whether and how to react.

In Russian-Estonian relations what explains Russia's (largely) normative approach coupled with its failure to achieve normative results?

### *Internal context*

Russia's policy goals towards Estonia have been greeted by a rare show of unanimity amongst Russian policy-makers and commentators who believe that Tallinn's 'cultural distancing' from (or 'cultural revenge' against) its Russian-speaking minorities reflects a clear clash with European norms. A presidential representative put it bluntly: Estonian authorities "little by little push European countries to a comprehensive rethink of the Second World War. The actions undertaken by Estonian authorities challenge post-war political traditions in Europe, including

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<sup>10</sup> <http://lenta.ru/story/campaign/>

<sup>11</sup> [http://lenta.ru/news/2007/05/08/goods/\\_Printed.htm](http://lenta.ru/news/2007/05/08/goods/_Printed.htm)

<sup>12</sup> [http://lenta.ru/news/2007/04/27/council/\\_Printed.htm](http://lenta.ru/news/2007/04/27/council/_Printed.htm)

those condemning Nazism. We do not want these so-called neophytes, people with exaggerated self-assessments and profound historical complexes to negatively affect European public opinion” (Yastrzhembskii, 2007). At the core of the crisis rests Estonia’s (mis)perception of Russia as an extension of the USSR, a Cold War loser and a country still bearing the historical guilt for the occupation of the Baltic states. This perception contrasts with Russia’s self-assessment as a country that rid itself of Communism just like Estonians did and that was a victim of Communism just like other post-Soviet countries were. Against this background, the Russian public debate often expresses the hope that through the EU, Estonia may be induced to respect human rights.

### *Internal capabilities*

Internal capabilities play a significant role in explaining Russia’s limited use of coercive means despite the unanimous condemnation of Estonia’s positions. First, economic sanctions against Estonia were opposed by Russia’s business community, which exerted strong pressure on hardliners in the Kremlin. As reported by the Russian media, Russian business has significant interests in various sectors of the Estonian economy, including the banking sector, tourist infrastructure, seaport facilities and transport routes (Kevorkova, 2007, p. 34). Second, Russia has strong political interests in not completely disrupting relations with Estonia. Estonia plays an important role in the Finno-Ugric culture, which is viewed in Russia as an important pathway linking Russia to Europe due to the large share of the Finno-Ugrian world in Russia. The absence of an Estonian delegation in the World Finno-Ugrian Congress in Saransk, Russia in 2007 was viewed as an important blow to Russia and questioned Moscow’s ability to influence Estonia.

### *External environment*

The Russian-Estonian tug-of-war must be placed in the external context of discursive asymmetry between the EU and Russia. Many have argued that Europe’s identity is constructed in opposition to its own past (Diez, 2005). This contrasts sharply with Russia’s identity construction, which is derived precisely from a glorification (rather than repudiation) of its history. Against this background, the Russian-Estonian crisis must be located within two wider discursive frameworks: the ‘new-old Europe’ and the related ‘true-false Europe’ dichotomies. ‘False Europe’, as dubbed by some Russian intellectuals, includes countries with strong anti-Russian sentiment that have lost touch with ‘genuine European values’. ‘True Europe’ includes Russia-friendly states that adhere to ‘the original spirit of Europe’. What is interesting about this classification is that ‘false’ Europeans, according to Russia, are those which have latched on to their national(ist) spirit and deviate from the European normative mainstream. The EU is thus viewed as the ‘norm-setter’, which ‘false’ Europe fails to comply with, making trouble for both Russia and the EU and acting as America’s ‘fifth column in Europe’.<sup>13</sup> By referring to ‘true Europe’, Russia affirms its own European identity and indicates its circle of friends (Morozov, 2004a). It also explicitly invites an EU role in settling the crisis with Estonia. Yet, as Morozov (2004b) suggests, “the fact that Russian commentators assume the right to pass judgement on the Baltic States from the position of a ‘true Europe’...does not necessarily imply that the Russian foreign policy discourse becomes structured in European terms. Russia does appeal to the norms of Europe, but stops short of applying the same norms to her own policy”. This, coupled with intra-EU solidarity, is what makes Russian arguments less convincing to the EU.

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<sup>13</sup> Echo Moskvyy Radio website, April 28, 2004, <http://www.echo.msk.ru/interview/1.html>

### 2.3 Realpolitik intended: Russia's policy towards Poland, 2004-

Russia's policy towards Poland displays a Realpolitik pattern of foreign policy. The new EU member states were keen to reposition themselves vis-à-vis Russia and play a useful role as newcomers. The most striking example of this was Poland's Eastern Dimension (ED), which was met by Russia with a great deal of suspicion and irritation. This case study focuses on the events that followed the debate on the Eastern Dimension blueprint.

#### *Goals*

The overall goal of Russia's policy towards Poland is non-normative: to prevent Warsaw from becoming a key voice in the EU's Eastern policy. Poland features in Russian discourse as a country with a devious political intent, fuelled by Washington and aimed at band-waggoning against Russia. Moscow does not hide that its attitude towards Warsaw is driven by geopolitical considerations. First, Poland is treated as an American satellite with limited capacity for independent foreign policy. Second and because of this, Russia believes it must block all Polish attempts to act as the EU's voice in its Eastern policy. Moscow believes that Poland, like other post-Soviet states, merely aims at distancing itself, and thus the EU, from Russia. Indeed, there are some indications that Poland's main stimulus is to "ultimately separate [ex-socialist countries] from the post-Soviet space" (Hyndle & Kutysz, 2002, p. 48). The failed ED was clearly biased towards the idea of a Europe of concentric circles with clear subordination to a single political centre. Moreover, Poland wanted to mould the ED as a continuation of its centuries-long conflict with Russia by gaining a voice in the EU and undermining any inclination in the EU to follow a 'Russia-first' policy. Unsurprisingly Russia believes that Poland is reluctant to accept EU policies in the neighbourhood and pushes the Union to distinguish Ukraine (and possibly Moldova and Belarus) from other neighbours (Kazin, 2003). Russia's reaction has been scathing. Political analyst Mark Urnov has dubbed Poland ("a small country", in his view) as being swayed by "foolish myths and prejudices of the crowd".<sup>14</sup> Filip Kazin (2003), in reference to EU neighbourhood policies, argues that "Poles ... fix the 'weight categories' and put one of the players [Russia] out of the competition, while the EU bureaucracy wants to place everybody on a level playing field, hold training exercises and see what comes out". The typical Russian interpretation of Poland's motives are framed in clear Realpolitik terms: "Warsaw is pursuing a goal that has no direct relation to Moscow: to strengthen its position within a united Europe and to join the inner circle of the EU's most influential countries" (Lukyanov, 2007, p. 9).

#### *Means*

Russia carried out its policies towards Poland through hard-nosed economic leverage. In 2006 Russia resorted to economic sanctions against Poland, having banned the import of Polish meat and poultry. The official explanation referred to the low quality of these food products. Yet this was met by widespread scepticism in Europe. The ban appeared to be an attempt on the one hand to pressurise Warsaw and on the other hand to protect Russian agricultural markets against EU-subsidised agricultural products. As put by President Putin (2007a): "the point is not only the meat supplies from Poland. We see this problem as one related to the EU subsidising of its own agricultural sector and throwing away its products to our market".

Beyond leverage, Russia has also dealt with Poland through neglect and by dealing directly with the EU and minimising contacts with Polish diplomacy. This also suggests that in order to act as a credible intermediary, a regional actor such as Poland must be viewed as legitimate by both

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<sup>14</sup> <http://www.strana.ru/print/147360.html>

centres (the EU and Russia). Russia's own approach has not been normative. A perfect example of this was the celebration of the 750<sup>th</sup> anniversary of Kaliningrad-Kenigsberg, in which Russia deliberately excluded the delegations from Poland (and Lithuania). This event – attended by the leaders of Germany and France amongst others – was highly indicative of how Moscow (as well as Paris and Berlin) perceives decision-making in Europe. The Kaliningrad anniversary, which was supposed to manifest Russia's commitment to cross-border cooperation, ultimately incarnated Russia's realpolitik ambitions of belonging to and dealing exclusively with Europe's 'masters' at the expense of communication with smaller 'New Europeans' such as Poland.

### *Impact*

Russia has been rather successful in portraying Poland as a challenge to both Russia and the EU, as well as a complicating factor in EU-Russia relations. Russia effectively exploited EU criticisms of Polish foreign policy. For example Russia's media coverage of the 19 October 2007 European Council was rife with allegations that "it is Poland, not Russia, who scares Europe".<sup>15</sup> The (possibly temporary) congruence of views between Moscow and the EU of the Kaczinski brothers has given Russia a rare chance to present its concerns about Poland in a manner that resonates in the EU. In this setting, Poland's attempt to acquire a special role in the EU was hindered by both Moscow and Brussels. Russia was extremely reluctant to accept Poland's self-attributed role as the leading EU voice in the Eastern neighbourhood. By the same token, the EU was unwilling to entrust Poland with a special role in articulating its Eastern policy in view of its troubled relations with Moscow. In addition, Polish ambitions were seriously undermined by the Russian-German platform on the North European Gas pipeline project.

What explains Russia's realpolitik approach towards Russia and the EU's seeming acceptance of Russia's non-normative approach?

### *Internal context*

Poland was part of the Russian domestic discourse in several controversial ways. First, during the debates on the future of Kaliningrad, Poland gained the reputation of being a country that was reluctant to ensure transit and communication between mainland Russia and the Kaliningrad exclave. Second, Poland featured as a country that allegedly supported and helped orchestrate the 'orange revolution' in Ukraine, thus stimulating Kiev's shift away from Russia and towards the West. Third, Russia's temporary ban on Polish meat was discussed and justified in Russia as a necessary act of self-sufficiency, protecting Russian 'food security'. Fourth, there were numerous TV stories in the Russian media portraying Poland as a country prone to challenging the Russian interpretation of the Second World War, whereby Russia led the liberation of Eastern Europe from Nazism. All these aspects help explain the antagonistic context in which Russia's possession goals towards Poland were formulated.

### *Internal capabilities*

Russia acknowledges that its resources to influence Polish policies are limited. As such, throughout the 1990s and beyond, Russia adopted a classical 'wait-and-see' approach that ended in Russia's inability to formulate a strategy in anticipation of Poland's NATO and EU accession. The question of which policy instruments were to be used with regards to countries like Poland was never seriously raised in Russian public and elite debates. Moreover, Moscow seemingly felt more comfortable discussing Poland-related problems in dialogue with Brussels (concerning a variety of border-related issues) or Washington (concerning the deployment of the

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<sup>15</sup> *Moskovskie novosti*, N 41 (1408), October 19-25, 2007. p. 14.

new anti-missile system) than directly with Warsaw. In the fall of 2007, with the electoral victory of Donald Tusk's party, the Kremlin instead began appreciating some of the reconciliatory moves undertaken by the new Polish government, including the fulfilment of Russian demands to deploy quality control experts in Polish meat-processing factories. This clearly suggests that Russia is inclined to use essentially (coercive) economic levers in relations with antagonistic countries like Poland, while leaving hard security questions for discussion with major powers such as the United States and NATO.

### *External environment*

Initially, there were some positive openings in Russian-Polish relations, which were unfortunately lost in time. To bolster its membership credentials within the framework of EU accession in the late 1990s, Warsaw was eager to present itself as a constructive source of innovation to the EU, offering solutions on issues such as border visa policies (i.e., introducing multiple single day entry visas and the 'delimited territory Schengen visas'). Within the ED framework, Poland wished to demonstrate to the EU that the Union's future Eastern border regions were diverse and had special needs, and thus required differentiated EU policies (Gromadzki & Osica, 2002). At some point a Polish spokesman even forecasted that the ED would have a larger and more multilateral scope than its sister initiative in the North (the Northern Dimension) (Kokoncuk, 2003). In this light, some experts from Warsaw made it clear that enforcing the Schengen *acquis* would have detrimental effects on the candidate countries' relations with their Eastern neighbours, failing to prevent organised crime but potentially becoming insurmountable obstacles for thousands of ordinary citizens (Boratynski & Gromadzki, 2001). Many Polish authors claimed that for EU newcomers the problem of Kaliningrad ought to be ranked higher than for the Union's founding fathers, suggesting that Poland's future EU membership could raise the likelihood of a visa-free deal with Russia. Criticising the EU's 'one size fits all' approach was also part of the Polish discourse in those years and it was widely argued that it was because of the EU that Poland (and Lithuania) were forced to introduce visa requirements for Kaliningrad residents (Gromadzki & Wilk, 2001, p. 9).

Yet following Poland's EU accession and the rise to power of the Kaczynski brothers, the Polish scene radically changed, sharpening disagreements between Moscow and Warsaw. An additional factor that further complicated relations was Poland's acceptance of American plans to deploy anti-missile infrastructure on Polish territory. The Russian military establishment interpreted this move as another proof of Polish enmity and Poland's alignment with US-sponsored military plans directed against Russian security interests. Casting Russian-Polish disagreements within the wider frame of Russia-EU relations suggests that both Moscow and Brussels have pragmatically used the Polish veto as a good pretext for slowing down EU-Russia dialogue. Besides, Russia tried to take advantage of the Polish veto given that Russian energy policy towards Europe may be facilitated by Russia's expected fragmentation of a united EU front.<sup>16</sup>

## **2.4 Realpolitik unintended: Russia's policy towards the 'colour revolutions', 2003-**

Russia's policy toward the countries of the 'colour revolutions' (Georgia and Ukraine) provides an interesting case of a realpolitik response to a normative challenge. Here we see one of the deepest discursive gaps between the EU and Russia: the former prefers to frame its policy towards the revolutions in normative terms (i.e., promoting democracy and civil liberties) while

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<sup>16</sup> *Kommersant*, June 22, 2007, p. 9.

the latter claims that crude realpolitik lies at the kernel of Western interference. In fact, Russia denies the normative appeal of the colour revolutions, reducing them to power confrontations. This case study covers the events that followed the colour revolutions in Ukraine and Georgia since 2003.

### Goals

There are two possession goals that Russia pursues in its neighbourhood: to prevent the advent to power of anti-Russian regimes, and to block any prospect of exporting the ‘colour revolutions’ to Russia proper. The Kremlin dubs “the so-called colour revolutions in Ukraine, Georgia and Kyrgyzstan” as a Western ploy to install pro-American regimes in Russia’s periphery and then engineer a regime change in Russia itself” (Trenin, 2005, p. 1). For Russia, the colour revolution countries are perceived as troublemakers: relations with Ukraine have been complicated by Kiev’s increasing orientation towards EU and NATO, while Georgia has also been accused of supporting Chechen separatists. Russian policy-makers view Georgian and Ukrainian initiatives with irritation and as an indication of these countries’ malevolent intentions towards Russia. Hence, Russia’s negative reactions to the political events in Georgia after Eduard Shevardnadze and in Ukraine after Leonid Kuchma. In both cases, post-revolution developments are not seen as having engendered democracies of superior quality to than in Russia. On the contrary, the political systems established by President Yuschenko and President Saakashvili are frequently presented as being inferior to that in Russia: Ukraine is going through a period of intense instability and threatened fragmentation/disintegration, while Georgia has established a hyper-centralised authoritarian and repressive regime. While moving in different directions, developments in both Georgia and Ukraine confirm Russia’s negative attitude to the revolutions and their aftermath. Another geopolitical reason for Russia’s reaction to the revolutions is Moscow’s disappointed expectations with the West after September 11<sup>th</sup>, in which Russia hoped to be recognised as a much closer Western and European ally than any other post-Soviet country. In this sense, the colour revolutions supported by the West designated a Russian failure to be treated as “dealer of the European values all across the ex-Soviet space” (Remizov, 2005).

### Means

In the case of Ukraine, Russia used strong political pressure to force Kiev to make concessions in two important areas. The first is the recognition of Russian as an official language in Ukraine, given that the majority of Ukrainians are Russian-speakers. The second is to prevent Ukraine’s NATO integration, given Russia’s strategic plans to maintain a military presence in Sebastopol. To pursue these objectives Russia has used a variety of non-normative instruments:

- manipulating energy prices;
- interfering in the 2004 electoral campaign through the participation of Russian experts in electoral engineering;
- manipulating border demarcation: in 2003 the small island of Tuzla near the Taman peninsula became a source of serious tensions between Russia and Ukraine as a result of Russian attempts to build a dike there.<sup>17</sup>

In the case of Georgia, Russia has reacted to Saakashvili’s anti-Russian policy by meddling in the situation in the breakaway republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which gravitate

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<sup>17</sup> *Komsomol’skaya pravda*, October 16, 2003, 4.



towards the Russian sphere of influence. In doing so, Russia has used a variety of coercive instruments:

- introducing a visa regime which targets thousands Georgians who temporarily (and sometimes unofficially) work in Russia. The Russian government is fully aware and is ready to exploit its economic leverage, which includes energy supplies and the attractiveness of the Russian labour market for Georgian citizens.
- Exerting military pressure (incidents have included the violation of Georgia's airspace and the bombing of unspecified military air jets). It is not surprising that, according to a high-ranking Georgian official, it is Russia that plots terrorist acts against Georgia.<sup>18</sup>
- banning the import of Georgian wine and mineral water under the pretext of the bad quality of these products;
- granting Russian citizenship to residents of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, a policy which may lead to the de facto integration of these secessionist republics into Russia. Interestingly, in August 2007 the Russian Foreign Minister defined the residents of North Ossetia (in Russia) and South Ossetia 'a single people'.<sup>19</sup>
- Conducting anti-Georgian media campaigns in Russia, which provoked – perhaps unintentionally – repressive and discriminatory actions against Georgian owners restaurants, nightclubs and casinos in Moscow and other major cities in Russia.

### *Impact*

Russia's realpolitik policies towards Georgia and Ukraine have unwittingly provoked a normative reaction from the West. More specifically, the establishment of the Community of Democratic Choice, as well as the deepened integration of Georgia and Ukraine in EU and NATO institutional spheres are good indications of this trend. The revival of the 'orange coalition' in the aftermath of the Ukrainian parliamentary elections in September 2007 could also be viewed as a normative development. Russia eventually accepted the normative challenge and counterattacked in normative terms. For example, a State Duma statement of 2 October 2007 accused the Saakashvili regime of violating democratic principles and human rights, including tightening control over the opposition and repressing dissidents. Such a response cannot be simply viewed as an opportunistic realpolitik response covered in normative clothing given the absence of a genuinely pro-Russian opposition in Georgia. An important factor that has strengthened Russia's normative reaction was the West's gradual and reluctant appreciation, beginning in November 2007, that there is indeed significant popular discontent in Georgia against "a clique that will neither tolerate dissent nor engage in dialogue with the opposition".<sup>20</sup> These assessments coincide with the dominant view in Russia. Russia, by the same token, has accused Western countries of backing Saakashvili's "illusionary democracy" which, in Russian eyes, is oligarchic and despotic (Demurin, 2007, p. 16).

What explains on the one hand Russia's realpolitik policies in Ukraine and Georgia, and on the other hand the West's normative reactions to these revolutions and Russia's increasingly normative counter-response?

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<sup>18</sup> Antadze attacks Russia's anti-Georgian campaign, *The Messenger*. N 172 (1192), September 12, 2006, p. 1.

<sup>19</sup> *Expert*, N 30, August 20-26, 2007, p. 4.

<sup>20</sup> Georgians chastise once-popular leader, *International Herald Tribune*, November 3-4, 2007, p. 3.

### *Internal context*

Russia's disdain for the colour revolutions is strongly supported by a nationalist and power-driven discourse. This explains Russia's non-normative goals vis-à-vis these countries and the coercive policy instruments used towards them. At the same time, Russia's nationalist drivers of policy, are facing several challenges, explaining the recent normative turn in Russia's policy response. On the one hand, the policy of confrontation with Georgia and Ukraine has clear cultural limitations since both countries are widely perceived as being culturally close to Russia and sharing similar historical and religious legacies. On the other hand, some in Russia are beginning to appreciate the fundamental miscalculation underpinning the Kremlin's policy: the assumption that "if they get rid of this pro-western leadership, it will naturally be replaced by a pro-Russian leadership. There is almost no pro-Russian constituency in Georgia" (Dunbar, 2006, p. 2). Even Ukrainian former Prime Minister Yanukovich, despite his political rhetoric, cannot be considered as a genuinely pro-Russian politician. In other words, as Russia appreciates that it is gradually losing its political leverage over its near abroad, it may gradually rid itself of its imperial approach and reframe its policy in a more pragmatic way.

### *Internal capabilities*

While Russia continues to use coercive policy instruments towards Georgia and Ukraine, empowered by its significant leverage on these two countries, there has been a noticeable shift in Russia's policy tools used especially towards Ukraine between 2004 and 2007. A revealing indication of this was President Putin's statement that "if the West wishes to support the 'orange movements', let it pay for them. Otherwise the impression is that you wish to support them and simultaneously make us pay for that" (Putin, 2007a). This statement indicates the Kremlin's more pragmatic – albeit cynical – acceptance of the status quo in these countries and its abandonment of staunch political/ideological opposition to be pursued with any means at its disposal. Putin's declaration suggests Russia's gradual acceptance of Ukrainian independence, whose relations with Russia do not fit any longer into a 'patron – client' framework.

### *External environment*

Russia's stance vis-à-vis the colour revolutions can be analysed within the wider framework of developments in the Baltic-Black Sea region (BBSR). The BBSR, being deprived of any sense of cultural and social cohesiveness could emerge as a political project in order to expand the zone of democracy in EU-Russia border regions. The idea of countries such as Poland, Lithuania and Estonia to construct such a region has been strongly inspired by the colour revolutions in Ukraine and Georgia. An important element in this idea relates specifically to the Caucasus. The aspiration to transfer the Baltic experience with democratisation to the south is often flagged by 'New Europe' countries, and rhetorically backed by the US and the EU. Russia naturally has strong interests in deconstructing the 'Baltic-Black Sea' equation both politically and semantically. Moreover, Russia has considerable experience in playing divide and rule with its neighbours.<sup>21</sup> However, this logic does not seem to work in the case of the BBSR. Most Russian opinion-makers have unexpectedly acknowledged the existence of the BBSR and based upon it geopolitical reflections. Arguably, Russia badly needs an imagined BBSR in order to corroborate some of its foreign policy assumptions. Instead of questioning the coherence of this imagined entity, Moscow has used this region-building project as a means to symbolically

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<sup>21</sup> For example, Lithuania – as Russia's closest partner in the Baltic – is usually contrasted with the more unfriendly Latvia and Estonia. Finland, as the most trusted among Russia's interlocutors in Northern Europe, has been pitched against Denmark. Pro-Russian Armenia instead is instead often contrasted with US-oriented Georgia.

construct Russia's identity in opposition to allegedly unfriendly 'New Europe'. The BBSR may thus turn into Russia's new 'other', an unidentifiable political object which nevertheless may be used pragmatically to nourish Russian nationalism.

## **2.5 Imperial intended: Russia's war on terror, 2001-**

Russia's 'war on terror' fits, by and large, into the imperial category in view of the normative coating of Russia's foreign policy goals coupled with its authoritarian decision-making style. This case study covers the period following the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks.

### *Goals*

Although Russia's goals in the 'war on terror' can be formulated in security terms, they also have strong normative connotations (which however differ from those in the normative intended and unintended case studies). Norms in the imperial case studies mean the protection of peace and avoidance of violence directed against legitimate governments. Moreover, there are some indications that Russia's political class shares the view that "if we are to deal with new terrorism in any normative way, then we should address the entire sequence of mobilization, complex causes, radicalization process and active symptoms of terrorism, in a 'genuinely multi-pronged' approach" (Manners, 2006, p. 413). It is within this framework that one can analyse the normative dimension of Russia's war on terror. This dimension includes the attempt at normalising Chechnya through development and the rule of law, and fighting xenophobia, extremism, and religious fundamentalism across Russia.

### *Means*

The Russian debate on the war in terror has concentrated primarily on the adequate means to be employed in the anti-terror campaign. The Kremlin shares a widespread view that anti-terrorism measures require political will rather than a strict observance of international and internal law. The need for political leadership and will reflects the inclination to pursue policies through authoritarian means. For instance, President Putin's increased authority after the 2004 Beslan tragedy enabled him to take controversial political decisions such as abolishing popular elections of governors, rather than following democratic procedures.

The same goes for Russia's appeal to EU member states (particularly Denmark and the UK) to restrict the activities of groups considered by Moscow as being close to Chechen terrorists. Particularly noteworthy was the dispute between Russia and Denmark in 2002, when the World Chechen Congress was convened in Copenhagen. Russian officials felt that the Congress should be banned in view of its security implications, whereas Denmark refused this securitised logic and rested its arguments on the logic of the rule of law. In other words, Moscow reasoned that terrorism, as a radical violation of all 'rules of the game' should leave no room for compromise. Danish responses regarding the legal obstacles preventing a ban on the Congress were interpreted in Russia as a deplorable political excuse for inaction. As a footnote, it is remarkable that a few years later it was the EU that resorted to a similar line of reasoning, accusing Russia of political maneuvering in its energy policy, to which Russia rebuked that its stance was justified by technical rules and regulations that could not be violated.

Another interesting example was during the Danish 'cartoon crisis'. There are two aspects of this discourse worth noting. First, while Russia accepted the normative value of civil liberties, it claimed that these should be curtailed in view of the political/security repercussions from the Muslim world. Many argued that security matters related to religion cannot simply be regulated by law and require exceptional political decisions. "Only a narrow-minded idiot can be misled by incantations about the allegedly sacred freedom of speech" argued Sergey Pereslegin (2006),

a Russian political analyst. Others have declared that the Danish stance was an “outrageous and disgraceful occurrence”, or even “immoral prank”.<sup>22</sup> Russian officials sharply criticised the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) for siding with the Danish journalists. The chairman of the State Duma Committee on International Affairs expressed his regret that “Europe failed to draw far-reaching conclusions after the caricature scandal”, implying that Russia should set a more positive example.<sup>23</sup> Putin’s personal response to the Danish authorities also referred to the need for a political response in such exceptional situations: “if the state is incapable of preventing (the publication of such cartoons), it at least has to apologise for this inability”.<sup>24</sup> Hence, the logic goes, in sensitive cases prone to public unrest and mass violence, authorities should make exceptions to established rules guaranteeing freedoms.

Second, the cartoon crisis induced Russia to go a step further. During the crisis, the first Deputy Chairman of the State Duma declared that the publication of the cartoons “is much worse than a mere mistake; it is almost a crime”.<sup>25</sup> In other words, what was criminalised in Russia, was not an eventual banning of the cartoons (in violation of civil liberties), but rather the insult to millions of Muslims across the globe. In the conflict between freedom of speech (the norm) and anti-religious sacrilege (the exception), higher value is attached to the latter. In 2006, there were several legal cases initiated by Russian authorities against media outlets and web portals that either reprinted the Danish cartoons or published comments on them. In security issues, Russia has thus played with two arguments. The first, addressed mainly to European audiences, appeals to the policy of exceptions in cases of emergency. The second, going a step further and coined for domestic consumption, claims that the government should criminalise attempts to transfer to Russia EU standards of freedom of speech as applied to sensitive ethno-religious issues.

### *Impact*

Russia – like many other states – is learning to react to the challenge of terrorism, experimenting with different responses. One reaction has had normative connotations and is grounded in the efforts to promote the peaceful coexistence of different ethnic groups and Russian multiculturalism. An expression of this approach is the concealment of the ethnic origin of terrorists. For example, in September 2007 a State Duma bill proposed to ban all references to the ethnic background of criminals. Another Russian reaction has been the association of terrorism with other threats. At the 2007 Shanghai Group summit, President Putin set out a triad of ‘common threats’ – ‘terrorism, separatism, extremism’. A logical extension of this broad understanding of terrorism leads in a non-normative direction, since it may be used for all sorts of purposes, including discrediting the Kremlin’s political opponents. In fact, terrorism has turned into one of the most effective weapons of verbal denigration of the opposition. For example, the St. Petersburg-Moscow train crash in August 2007 was covered by the Russian media as a terrorist act presumably related to the forthcoming elections. Yet this type of discourse has not been effective to date. In the train crash incident four different hypotheses were publicly discussed, including ‘Chechen terrorists’, Russian radical nationalists, criminals, and youth groups playing war games. What is interesting in this menu of choices is that it groups together drastically different groups (professionals and amateurs, Russian nationalists and Chechen extremists). Hence, on the one hand, the Enemy is perceived as multifaceted,

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<sup>22</sup> The statement of the representative of the Republic of Ingushetia in the Council of Federation Issa Kostoyev, at <http://www.regions.ru/news/1950800/>

<sup>23</sup> “Pravoslavie.ru” web site, January 25, 2007.

<sup>24</sup> <http://www.regions.ru/news/1950800/>

<sup>25</sup> “United Russia” party web site, [www.edinoros.ru](http://www.edinoros.ru)

reducing the mobilising potential of anti-terrorist discourse. Yet on the other hand, the conflation of opposite interpretations of terrorism provides an additional justification of repressive measures.

What explains the normative undertones of Russia's framing of the war on terror, coupled with the non-normative choice of policy means and the mixed albeit partly normative impact of Russian policies?

### *Internal context*

The internal political context is driven by Russia's experience of the war in Chechnya and the international criticism it faced due to mass-scale human rights violations. Chechnya explains why President Putin decided to ban the elections of the regional chief executive in the aftermath of the Beslan hostage crisis. The dominant attitude in the Kremlin presumes that only through a recentralisation of power in federal institutions can terrorism be defeated in Russia. By the same token, the issue of terrorism demonstrates the multiple links between foreign and domestic policies and the growing overlap between Inside and Outside. The Internal Enemy is typically presented as a projection and continuation of the External Enemy.

### *Internal capabilities*

The menu of Russia's internal capabilities in the field of anti-terrorism is rather complicated. On the one hand, Russia often applies extra-legal means to fight domestic terrorism; on the other hand, it tries to legitimise its actions by referring to legal arguments (e.g. the government accused Russian media outlets that reprinted the Danish cartoons of violating 'hate speech' legislation). Regarding the use of policy instruments, the Russian debate is split. Some equate terrorism with a particular type of political challenge; others view terrorism as criminal acts that require a legal response; while others still interpret terrorism as an expression of mental deviation. These interpretations are to some extent linked. The perception of terrorism as radical expression of enmity sets the frame for discursive politicisation. Yet as soon as this frame is replaced by one that views terrorism as a mental deviation, the situation ceases to be understood through the prism of normal politics and focuses on techniques of social control, regulation and adjustment. At the same time there are clear tensions between different interpretations. As far as the terrorists are concerned, there is a tendency to present criminal acts as being politically driven and yet requiring a political justification. As far as the victims are concerned, in so far as the legal system may fail to produce an adequate response to violations, the tendency is to bypass the law and seek an overtly political response.

### *External environment*

Finally, the international environment, while not helping much in understanding the (partly) normative impact of Russia's approach to terrorism, has reinforced Russia's tendency to act in an imperial fashion (i.e., pursuing normative goals through non-normative means). The external environment has been a highly divisive issue in Russia. On the one hand, the US experience is viewed as problematic and anti-terrorist cooperation with the UK was frozen due to the 'Litvinenko scandal'. On the other hand, Russia is increasingly distrustful of the activities of international organisations in the North Caucasus and considers that the British and Danish governments have been too soft on Chechen terrorism. It is the combination of these factors that condition Russia's unilateral/imperial type of conduct in this policy area.

## 2.6 Imperial unintended: the Russian-British dispute over the 'Litvinenko case', 2006

This case study focuses on the critical worsening of Russian-British relations as a result of Alexander Litvinenko's murder in London in 2006.

### *Goals*

There are two tactical and one strategic goal in Russia's policy in the Litvinenko case. Among the tactical goals, Russia wanted to disavow widespread accusations of having commissioned the killing of a former KGB agent in London and turn the case against tycoon Boris Berezovsky in order to induce the UK to extradite him to Russia. Moscow's strategic goal was to stage a showcase of Russia's rising power, self-assertiveness and sovereignty. Both tactical and strategic goals were framed through an explicitly normative discourse. Officially, Russia framed the problem in legal terms. It was the UK which, in Russian eyes, politicised the situation by alluding to Russia's inadequate legislation that made it impossible to extradite Andrei Lugovoi, by referring to Lugovoi's goodwill in accepting trial in the UK, and by attempting to extract sensitive information from Lugovoi to discredit Russian politics and President Putin. Yet while Moscow self-confidently asserted its legal and apolitical approach to the problem, this was widely doubted elsewhere. A strong nationalist and sovereignty-based discourse was in fact hidden between the lines of Russian arguments, as exemplified by anti-British statements by people like Vladimir Zhirinovskii, Mikhail Leontiev and other conservative opinion-makers in Russia.

### *Means*

Russia used hard-nosed economic leverage towards the UK in response to British policies. Moscow threatened to boycott British goods in Russian markets. As put by Viacheslav Nikonov: "starting from this point, British business will face more difficulties in Russian markets".<sup>26</sup> In other words, in this case (as in others), Russia manifested its readiness to use economic levers as an overtly political weapon beyond the confines of the law. In the Russian-British tug-of-war political divisions were deemed by both countries as constituting a sufficient reason to reconsider bilateral economic relations. Finally, Russia attempted to discredit the UK within the EU by accusing it (as in the case of Poland) of being indiscriminately anti-Russian and undermining EU credibility in relations with Russia. The 'Litvinenko case' became another instance in which Russia attempted to sow European divisions by distinguishing between 'good' and 'bad' Europeans.

### *Impact*

The effects of this conflict are explicitly non-normative. First, the Litvinenko case ended in a diplomatic scandal between Moscow and London, with four diplomats from each side being expelled from the diplomatic service. Second, as a measure of retaliation against the UK, Russia announced the end of bilateral cooperation against terrorism. The two countries were deeply divided over the security implications of the case. For the UK, Litvinenko's murder was a terror-related case; while for Russia the key issue was Britain's unwillingness to extradite Akhmed Zakayev, who is accused in supporting terrorism in Russia. These divisions resulted in M15 Chief Jonathan Evans' assessment of Russia as an unfriendly country that diverts British

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<sup>26</sup> *Moscow News*, № 28 (1395), 20-26 July 2007, p.13.

resources to the illegal activities of Russian intelligence officers.<sup>27</sup> Third, Britain complicated its visa policy towards Russian public officials.

What explains Russia's policies and its results in the Litvinenko case?

### *Internal context*

The 'Litvinenko-Lugovoi affair' was framed in Russian domestic politics as a question of power and sovereignty. It is against this backdrop that one has to read Russia's strong rhetoric against the UK, whose actions were viewed as "provoking", "shocking" and "insulting". On a more practical level, this case was intimately linked with figures such as Boris Berezovski, Akhmed Zakayev and other émigrés with a very bad reputation within Russia. Thus, Russian law-enforcement agencies accused Berezovski – an oligarch residing in London – of 'sponsoring terrorism' by supporting Chechen guerrillas and plotting the murder of Litvinenko in London.

### *Internal capabilities*

The Russian public and mass media induced or did nothing to stop the authorities from tackling the case through non-normative means. The case was widely perceived as an entertaining spy story, without a normative dimension. Andrei Lugovoi was also portrayed as a high profile media personality and political figure (he ran second and was elected in the Zhirinovski-led LDPR party in the 2 December 2007 elections of the State Duma).

### *External environment*

In the 'Litvinenko-Lugovoi case', the international environment was highly critical of Russia, criticising Moscow's inclinations to assert its independence and pursue its interests through all means available. This largely explains the non-normative results of the incident. Moscow failed to receive meaningful support from foreign governments and was isolated. The incident deteriorated Russia's image across the West, along with the murder of journalist Anna Politkovskaya. Under these circumstances, Russian policies towards Great Britain led to largely non-normative outcomes.

## **2.7 Status quo intended: Russia's policy in Kaliningrad, 2000-**

Russia's policies in the Kaliningrad dispute have been and continue to be characterised by a status quo type of international behaviour. The time frame of this case study ranges from the turn of the century to the present.

### *Goals*

Former presidential representative to Kaliningrad Dmitrii Rogozin, considering Kaliningrad "a matter of principle", made clear that Russia's political goals in the dispute should be prioritised over normative ones, followed by the settling of administrative technicalities.<sup>28</sup> Russia's overall political strategy has consisted of maintaining unchanged the status of the Kaliningrad Oblast (KO) in the Russian Federation, including the full implementation of Russian laws that regulate the internal affairs of the Oblast and its relationship with the federal centre. Russia did raise normative justifications for its policies, including the norms of 'dignity', 'respect', 'pride' and 'honour'. Yet these were pursued as legitimising elements in the attainment of Russia's possession goals, to be defended against the EU, which was viewed as undermining Russian

<sup>27</sup> *USA Today*, November 6, 2007, p. 2.

<sup>28</sup> D.Rogozin's web site, [www.rogozin.ru/massmedia/indirect/351/](http://www.rogozin.ru/massmedia/indirect/351/)

sovereign rights in the KO. The EU in turn claimed to pursue its own status quo logic – the application of the *acquis communautaire* to the Russian enclave. The clash of these two status quo logics defined the nature of the conflict as ‘a never ending process of constructing a boundary between ‘us’ and ‘them’, good and evil, and an acute fear that if this boundary is damaged, the identity of the community will be destroyed...Needless to say, such a discursive setting is hardly conducive to openness and de-bordering’ (Morozov, 2004a). Yet while both Russia and the EU applied a status quo logic to their goals in Kaliningrad, Moscow overtly applied a political logic to the issue, calling for a political move which is “not predetermined by the ‘original’ terms of the structure” and “requires a passage through the experience of undecidability ... to a creative act” (Laclau, 1996, p. 54). Russia argued that the EU should take a political decision to add “one more deviation from the strict rules to the already long list” of allowed exceptions (Moshes, 2004, p. 68). The EU insisted on a technical normative logic, giving a clear priority to the observance of the rules and regulations stipulated in Community law.

### *Means*

Russia and the EU however tackled the KO issue through normative means by implementing the idea of a pilot region. KO, as a pilot region, was designated as a new normative space to experiment with new opportunities. On the one hand, the pilot region idea fits a constructivist logic that asserts that regions are not predetermined entities but cognitive constructs. On the other hand, the pilot region notion has strong connotations with the business world and emerges from a culture of regional planning and spatial development, which gained prominence in Russia in the 2000s. The KO dispute was thus tackled as a ‘project’ to be implemented, and this greatly helped the desecuritisation of a potentially divisive problem. The ‘pilot project’ acted as a tool to bridge the gap between Russia’s highly politicised discourse on KO and the EU’s technical stance. The KO lent itself to the project owing to two main reasons. First, there is a widespread feeling that the KO, created as an administrative unit directly governed from the centre was somewhat dysfunctional in the post-Soviet context. The KO was in search of a new trans-regional identity, being pushed towards the periphery and deeply dissatisfied with its status. Second and related, not only the KO, but the Baltic region as a whole, has traditionally been open to new ideas. In so far as old patterns of regionalism had become obsolete, new ones had to be invented. In particular, the creation of the ‘Baltica’ Euroregion (which includes the KO) represented an attempt to multilateralise the regional agenda and enhance innovation, market solutions, consumer protection and provide better access to public goods and services. It also represented a region of innovation and progress, i.e. “a learning region” (Asheim, 2001) as well.

### *Impact*

The KO dispute was partially de-securitised by:

- a) Placing EU-Russia visa-free travel on the bilateral agenda;
- b) promoting the environment, anti-corruption programmes and other soft security issues on the bilateral agenda;
- c) Russia’s increasing focus on technical issues such as upgrading ferry and aircraft communications between Kaliningrad and mainland Russia; improving border crossing arrangements; downsizing the shadow economy; raising managerial standards and providing KO residents with proper international passports;
- d) Negotiating a re-admission treaty with the EU.



Yet at the same time, results are not fully normative. The pilot region discourse while accepted in theory, still lacks clarity in practice. A first approach is liberal/reformist, presuming that the KO might become a pilot or litmus test for liberal reforms in Russia. A second reading considers the pilot region idea as a means to extract privileges for the KO from the federal centre and the EU, and as such it has triggered negative reactions from other regions. A third interpretation is rooted in Russia's defensive discourse, claiming that the KO as a pilot region would act as a Western Trojan horse into Russia. A fourth approach views the pilot region idea as a transnational cooperation project, experimenting in trans-boundary multi-level governance in soft security issues. Table 1 analyses these four interpretations, characterising them on the basis of several dichotomies: a) centrality/marginality; b) specificity/normality; c) political/technical.

*Table 3. Four interpretations of the “pilot region” concept*

	<b>A: Periphery/margins</b>	<b>B: Specificity/normality</b>	<b>C: Political/ technical</b>
<b>1. Testing liberal reforms</b>	Useful marginality	Specificity as a disadvantage	De-politicisation
<b>2. Promoting local interests</b>	Useful marginality	Specificity as a main advantage	Politicisation in the framework of centre-periphery relations
<b>3. Strengthening Russia's status</b>	Peripheral	Ambiguous	Deliberate politicisation
<b>4. Transnational cooperation</b>	Useful marginality	Specificity as a practical advantage	De-politicisation prevails

Table 3 requires additional comments. The ‘peripheral vs. marginal’ dichotomy offers valuable insights regarding where the KO is heading. The concept of margins draws from Noel Parker (2000, p. 6): unlike peripheries which are subordinated to centres, margins are autonomous spaces and as such able to develop independent strategies based on cooperation with adjacent territories. Unlike peripheries, margins are reluctant to accept subordination from the centre and participate in defining the nature of the core instead. Hence, in option 3A, the KO is doomed to remain a voiceless periphery, with limited possibilities to influence the two cores (Moscow and Brussels). In options 1A, 2A and 4A instead the KO is better placed to reinvent its marginal role and seize the opportunities available to new regional actors. The ‘specificity vs. normality’ dyad invites a different outlook. Does a ‘pilot region’ need to be specific and unique, or should it represent the norm? As opposed to 2B, in the case of 1B, the KO's uniqueness is a main source of disadvantage in so far as its liberal policies (e.g. tax privileges and maintaining visa-free travel to Lithuania for several years) were viewed as unrepeatable elsewhere in Russia. In 3B instead, Kaliningrad's specificity has an uncertain effect: while Russia recognises the KO's uniqueness as an asset in its negotiations with the EU, it refuses to apply special measures to manage the region effectively. Finally, in the ‘political vs. technical’ column, option 1C is promoted by technical experts, while 2C reflects the intricacies of Russian federalism: the more local interests are pursued, the greater the tensions between Moscow and the KO. As for 3C, Moscow intentionally politicises certain issues in order to retain control over public opinion. Option 4C is interesting in the sense that while depoliticisation is the norm, a reverse trend is possible, given that the KO's trans-national liaisons might eventually boost the region's claims for a stronger political status in the federation, triggering a backlash from Moscow.

### *Internal context*

The internal political context is characterised by two factors. First, the need to protect the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation and second the desire to benefit from the KO's peculiar location. The first factor reflects Moscow's vision and played a greater role in specifying the goals (i.e., possession goals), while the second best captures local interests and pushed Russia to tackle the situation through innovative normative means.

The federal centre was highly suspicious of EU moves in Kaliningrad and constantly highlighted its sovereignty interests in the dispute. This suspicion entrenched a mentality of clashing identities, which assumed that the EU was purposely complicating the situation in order to weaken the KO's links with Russia (Vladimirov, 2003, p. 11). Interestingly for example, Gleb Pavlovskii, a Kremlin spin-doctor, used the word 'sovereignty' 17 times in a two-page interview released after the EU-Russia meeting in Svetlogorsk in May 2002.<sup>29</sup> Pavlovskii's approach was distinctly realist. He argued that granting a special administrative status to KO residents would provoke a chain reaction in Tatarstan, the Kuril Islands and other potentially troublesome parts of Russia; and he raised concerns that local authorities would act in their self-interest to the detriment of the federal centre by allowing corruption and selling 'KO citizenship' to outsiders. Others, such as the ex-leaders of the 'Rodina' party, discussed the KO issue in emotional and nationalistic language. KO was described as being 'encircled' by unfriendly neighbours and thus that its subordination to the federal centre had to be restored.<sup>30</sup> The federal centre was inclined to react to the situation defensively because of its disorientation, faced with blurred borders, shifting identities and an uncertain hierarchy of actors (Morozov, 2004b). Moscow resisted the conceptualization of the KO within an emerging Baltic/Nordic region, fearful of losing its levers on the Oblast.

By contrast, regional authorities have been sceptical of both the EU and Moscow. Some favoured a more pro-Russian approach. For example, a local politician compared the process of NATO enlargement with Germany's "Drang nach Osten" (Chernomorskii, 2007). In 2003 local political forces issued an open letter protesting against the ratification of the border treaty between Russia and Lithuania, arguing that this would pave the way for Lithuania's NATO membership and its blackmailing of Russia.<sup>31</sup> Others used geopolitical arguments against Moscow, conceptualised as the other hegemonic core. From Kaliningrad's perspective, Moscow is often viewed as a threat to trans-border cooperation (Moshes & Nygren, 2000, p. 28), a source of trouble and injustice, and a "huge monster that pumps out local money".<sup>32</sup> However others still, including regional authorities and the local population, more familiar with the realities in neighbouring Poland and Lithuania,<sup>33</sup> have resisted federal policies and called for an innovative normative solution to the dispute. In particular, the Baltic Republican Party, the leading voice of Kaliningrad's separatism, advocates a referendum on the future status of the KO, proposing a republic associated with Russia that would negotiate its division of competences with Moscow.

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<sup>29</sup> <http://www.strana.ru/print/137124.html>

<sup>30</sup> *Mayak Baltiki*, February 13, 2003, p. 2.

<sup>31</sup> *Baltiiskaya gazeta*, N 6 (74), 20.02.2003, p. 4.

<sup>32</sup> *Mayak Baltiki*, N 6 (51), 2003, p. 4.

<sup>33</sup> On average a Kaliningrad resident travels abroad 10-12 times more often than an average dweller of provincial Russia.

### *Internal capabilities*

Russia's domestic debate on what instruments it should use in the KO dispute have been intense. Some claimed that Russia faced technical and not political problems and should thus seek technical remedies such as upgrading communications, providing KO residents with international passports and welcoming new consulates in the KO.<sup>34</sup> According to this logic, what threatened the KO was not a new visa system, but Russia's lack of resources to upgrade the region's eastward communications (Smorodinskaia, 2007) and the absence of adequate EU financial support for the KO (Kobrinskaia, 2002). This reasoning favoured a desecuritized approach to the problem, which argued that if Russia as a whole was unable to behave as a Baltic country then some of its territories, such as the KO, might take the lead by applying European laws on Russian territory, including in spheres such as business regulation, environmental protection and product safety standards. In other words, whereas in other case studies Russia's understanding of normativity has been strongly embedded in the assertion of Russia's equal status vis-à-vis Europe, in the KO (as in the case of trans-border cooperation) a different understanding of normative action based on cooperation and multilateralism has taken precedence. Within this normative framework, one of the most debated issues has been the extent to which the KO should be treated as a 'special' region by Moscow. Whereas before most Kaliningraders would not distinguish themselves from Russians, today their 'special' identity is taking root, an identity which does not choose between Europe and Russia but carves its own space as an in-between region with a dual heritage: Russian and Soviet/Russian (Browning & Joenniemi, 2004). The logic favouring normative means seemed to prevail for a while given that in order to protect the status quo a special EU-Russia agreement and Moscow's special treatment of the KO were necessary. In other words, the KO was accepted as a pilot region (and thus a norm-setter) in EU-Russia relations because it was an exceptional case requiring innovative solutions (e.g., a special tax regime or simplified administrative procedures).

Yet this point of view continued to be met with opposition by federal bodies that feared that granting privileges and special rights would incite secessionist tendencies in the KO (drawn closer to the Baltic region and the West) and beyond. Hence, in July 2001 the National Security Council created a Governing Board of the Free Economic Zone, subordinated to the presidential representative of the North West Federal District (NWFD), which took over key regional competences. The Council on Foreign and Defence Policy also suggested that Kaliningrad should become a special federal unit without local elections and with a governor directly appointed by Moscow (Abramov, 2001, pp. 191-2).

### *External environment*

Having joined the Baltic region, the KO found itself in a controversial though stimulating environment, under multiple and sometimes conflicting external influences. In terms of religion, the Baltic region is located at the crossroads of Orthodox, Protestant and Catholic branches of Christianity; in ethnic terms, it crosscuts the Nordic, Slavic, and German/Prussian identities; in wider geocultural terms, it is the terrain where the Nordic and Baltic worlds meet each other as well as Central Europe. As such, the KO's external environment is a multi-tier patchwork "with varying degrees of Europeanness and Eastness" (Kuus, 2004). Furthermore, Kaliningrad may also benefit from an understanding of the EU's spatial order as set of overlapping circles, in which the KO may also find its place. But finding the KO's place in the Nordic and Baltic regions is not easy. Being part of several region-building initiatives, the KO has been cast in a new yet uncertain external environment. Furthermore the geographical proximity to the EU has not ensured steady and robust flow of European investment in the KO. Most West European

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<sup>34</sup> <http://www.politcom.ru/print.php?fname>

businessmen consider the oblast market as too underdeveloped, risky and immature for serious investment. In cultural terms, there is a widespread feeling that the KO's location has deprived it of a strong identity of its own (Misiunas, 2004; Jakobson-Obolenski, 2004, p. 8). The KO has always been an artificial territorial unit, a Soviet trophy of the Second World War with strong inclinations toward Europe (Krom, 2001).

## **2.8 Status quo unintended: Russia's energy policy, 2006-**

Russia's energy policy represents another type status quo foreign policy, yet in this case its results have been unintended. The time frame of this case study covers the period beginning with the interruptions of Russian energy supplies to Ukraine and Belarus in 2006.

### *Goals*

Russia pursues possession goals in its external energy policy. It attempts to bolster Russian power and influence in the world, using energy as a means to reassert its status in the international system. It also aims to further Russian economic interests by capitalising on the rising economic value of its natural resources.

### *Means*

At the same time however, Russia claims it acts through normative or 'normal' policy means. Indeed Russia uses two discourses in the conduct of its energy policy – politicised/non-normative and depoliticised/normative ones. Several examples illustrate the politicised/non-normative conduct of energy policy. First, energy policy has become a high profile issue in the complex web of Russia's geopolitical relations, particularly vis-à-vis its western neighbours, which are viewed by Moscow as posing meaningful security threats to Russia. The EU claims that Russia's energy policy has been a knee-jerk reaction to the orange revolution in Ukraine and an attempt to distract international attention from the excessive use of force in Chechnya and the allegedly authoritarian character of Putin's presidency (Monaghan, 2006, p. 17). The Russian-German gas pipeline deal has also been interpreted as evidence of Moscow's deliberate politicisation of energy matters, an attempt to signal that Russia needs no intermediaries in its dealings with West European powers. Second, politicisation occurs when the domestic rules are unclear, such as for example the criteria for distinguishing between 'strategic' and 'ordinary' oil reserves or between 'fair' and 'unfair' energy prices (Milov, 2005). Traditionally, the Kremlin's pricing policy has never been governed by world prices and Russian energy diplomacy has been a series of exceptions offered to special partners and friendly countries. In the 1990s, favourable gas prices were offered in exchange of the former Soviet countries' acceptance of Russian hegemony in the CIS (Abedelal, 2004, p. 126). In recent years, Russia has withdrawn these exceptions. It is in this context that denying exceptions is paradoxically viewed as a deeply political/non-normative gesture.

Yet Russia responds that the logic underpinning its energy policy is actually increasingly technical/economic and that Russia does not need assistants or facilitators in its energy dialogue with major European powers. Increases in energy prices are portrayed as a normative act, illustrating Russian willingness to conduct 'normal' and parity-based relations with its neighbours. As put by the Russian Foreign Minister: "the refusal of Moscow to resort to politicised approaches in trade and economic relations and the acceptance of market principles – what else could more convincingly confirm our commitment to provide normal state-to-state relations?" (Lavrov, 2007). The depoliticised strategy which Russia has resorted to since the mid-2000s is governed by market mechanisms, price liberalisation and the end of subsidised supplies of energy to friendly neighbours. Russia has publicly committed itself to following the same rules for all its energy consumers, regardless of their proximity to Russia or their

geopolitical importance (Khristenko, 2006, p. 13). In other words, Gazprom's business logic appears to be increasingly prevailing over the Kremlin's political reasoning. According to Putin (2007b) for example, the North European Gas Pipeline project is based on a "market solution beneficial to ultimate consumers" and accusations of countries like Poland are snubbed as "politically explicit sloganeering".

### *Impact*

The intricate combination of politicised and depoliticised approaches in Russia's energy policy has led to controversial results that may, unintentionally, be normative in the long-run. By turning from an exception-based to a norm-based approach, Russia has increasingly and vocally asserted its role as an energy super-power, whose status exempts it from international rules in the energy market (e.g., transparency standards, consultations with consumers and arbitration mechanisms). Indeed Russia's frequent energy disputes could have been resolved normatively through legal arbitration, and without relying on the disruption of energy supplies (World Economic Forum 2006). Yet precisely because of its rising role in world energy markets, Russia may well need to abide by international (normative) transparency standards in the long-run.

One of most positive developments in recent years has been the gradual spread of transparency standards in different segments of the Russian economy. In the energy market, the increasing appreciation of the need for transparency is leading to the establishment of norm-setting institutional arrangements (e.g., in terms of corporate governance, state-business relations, the management of energy flows and financial accountability). Transparency standards and procedures are thus likely to "become the normal way of working in all the relevant extractive industries".<sup>35</sup> Moreover, transparency standards and procedures serve the interests of different actors in Russian society. For business, transparency allows for fair rules of competition. For governments, it contributes to filling budgetary coffers. For public policy centres, it helps achieve professional and strategic goals. For international organisations, it contributes to lowering transaction costs that stem from corruption. In other words, while being a long-term process, the demand for transparency is likely to consolidate in Russia, leading to an unintended normative impact of Russia's status quo energy policy. Why is this the case?

### *Internal context*

Russia's energy policy is thus both increasingly de-politicised and hyper-politicised. Depoliticisation refers to the separation of energy policy from geopolitical imperatives, whereby companies keep a low profile and limit themselves to technocratic arguments. On the flip side, politicisation refers to the tendency to use energy as a weapon in the hands of Russia's ruling elite to strengthen their geopolitical standing. What explains this contradiction? The increasing overlap between norms and geopolitical interests provides much of the explanation. Russia's switch to normative/depoliticised approaches has overlapped with its explicitly political goals, in so far as this switch has harmed above all countries such as Georgia and Ukraine that have been drifting away from Moscow and towards the West. The gas price dispute illustrates this overlap: Russia claims that its position is grounded on the attempt to harmonise its energy prices for all consumers, yet in order to do so those countries whose energy prices were subsidised in the past and are now rising are precisely Russia's least friendly neighbours. The Sakhalin project controversy is another good example: while justified on environmental grounds, the media largely covered the story as a deeply political affair in which Russia deliberately attempted to exclude foreign companies from the Russian energy market (Kovalevskii, 2006, pp. 18-21). In other words, Russia's attempted depoliticisation has also aimed at legitimising its

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<sup>35</sup> *The Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative: Time to go Global*, Global Witness, October 2006.

more overtly political intent (Critchley, 1999). Sensitive to this, Russia's opponents finger-point each gesture of de-politicisation as grounded in purely political and thus non-normative calculations.

### *Internal capabilities*

The debate on transparency highlights how Russia's internal capabilities increasingly push for a normative approach in energy affairs. Government agencies provide the political impetus for greater transparency standards. Transparency allows higher tax incomes, induces efficient company development plans and fosters a healthy, reliable and competitive domestic energy market. Professional associations in turn help create the institutional environment for transparency by acting as mediators in complex situations. Expert analysis research centres instead provide information and monitoring, while NGOs mobilise segments of civil society (e.g. environmental organisations). Finally, the media places energy-related issues on the public agenda and creates fora for public debate.

A shift towards a normative energy policy (beyond the current overlap between geopolitical interests and normative behaviour) is not set in stone. A fundamental problem arises when different groups in the energy sphere overlap and their respective responsibilities become blurred. When, for example, groups in government and the energy business overlap or when NGOs become closely enmeshed in government (which is a likely prospect in view of the authoritarian evolution of the Putin regime), then the slide from transparency into corruption becomes far more likely. The problem, in my view, stems from the intersection of two unfortunate tendencies: on the one hand, the increasingly close and exclusive relations between the state and the oil business, and on the other hand, the decreasing resources available to NGOs, which are associated neither with the state nor with the energy sector. When the overlap between state and business increases there is also the risk of an exchange of roles between the two. The state shifts from being a regulator of financial flows and a monitor of law enforcement mechanisms into a corporation whose members are motivated primarily by personal enrichment. The reverse also happens when the leadership of an oil company starts behaving as a political actor. This blurring of roles leads to distortion, opening the way to the opaque and corrupt functioning of the energy sphere.

### *External environment*

The external environment shapes Russian energy policy in two ways. On the one hand, it generates demand leading to increased energy prices, allowing Russia to raise prices by referring to universal market norms. On the other hand, Western countries try to 'normalise' Russian energy policy by inducing the government to adopt the norms of transparency. Hence the unintended normative impact of Russia's policy. It is exactly this point that most of EU countries raised when reacting to the energy-related conflicts between Russia and Belarus in January 2007 (as well as between Russia and Ukraine in 2006). European countries tried to reframe the energy debate with Russia by offering a different understanding of the norm: rather than equating the norm with market prices, the EU suggested that normative action in energy policy meant the respect of transparency standards. Hence, in early 2007 European politicians reproached Russia not for increasing gas prices for Belarus, but for not consulting in advance with its consumers. Within this logic, predictability, trust and openness acquire greater normative value than mere compliance with market prices.

A good example of international attempts at inducing transparency in Russia's energy policy is the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). The EITI was government-led, being launched by British Prime Minister Tony Blair in 2002. But the concept of transparency it promoted focused much on the monitoring and public awareness functions of NGOs. The

implementation of the EITI has already received widespread support by major civil society actors such as the Soros Foundation (through the Revenue Watch Institute, Publish What You Pay, the Open Society Institute, and others). In 2006, the EITI was institutionalised through its secretariat in Oslo and has increasingly gained in reputation and credibility. Several of Russia's neighbours have already signed on to the Initiative, including Kazakhstan, Mongolia, Azerbaijan and Kyrgyzstan. The debate has begun regarding Russia's place in the EITI. As a member of the G8, Moscow has rhetorically supported the creation of an international transparency regime in the energy sector. However no practical steps have been taken to date. On the one hand, the Russian rhetoric on 'sovereign democracy' and 'energy superpower' bolster Russian claims to exceptionality, yet on the other hand Russia's entry in the WTO and negotiations on a new contractual agreement with the EU open the way for possible steps forward in the field of implementation of energy transparency standards. For example, one of the key figures in the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs hinted that Russia's objections to the Energy Charter – which it has signed but not ratified – will ultimately have to be overcome in so far as “if incidents such as those with Belarus or Ukraine, heaven forbid, should be repeated, they will in future become the subject not of bilateral relations between Russia and a country that breaks some rule or another, but of the international community”.<sup>36</sup> Furthermore, the more transparency standards are internationalised the less will Russia be able to keep out of these arrangements, given the reputational and ensuing FDI losses it would incur.

The situation is complicated by the fact that, unfortunately, most transparency-fostering impulses come from outside. Since the domestic demand for transparency in the energy sector is rather weak, it is unlikely that international norms will spill over into Russia automatically. Hence, Russia is only likely to adopt such standards when it appreciates its interests in doing so. The state's re-evaluation of the benefits of transparency could begin for several reasons. First, the need for transparency is closely linked to environmental policy. Oil leakages caused by the implementation of major international energy projects such as the Baltic Gas Pipeline System are widely recognised as representing key security problems, and in some areas (e.g. Baikal, Sakhalin, Shtockman gas field) the Russian government is increasingly responsive to the demand for environmental protection. Second, transparency norms are connected to anti-corruption strategies and more efficient tax collection. Third, greater transparency is a precondition for the enforcement of anti-trust legislation in energy markets. Fourth, transparency would aid Russian energy companies investing abroad. Both the Russian energy business and the government could have an interest in open information on the finances of countries Russia invests in. Fifth, in so far as Russia itself would welcome larger foreign investments, it will have to ultimately comply with international transparency standards.

### 3. Comparing the cases by way of conclusion

Given that the eight case studies reveal a varied picture of Russia's foreign policy, understanding where Russia's 'centre of gravity' lies is particularly difficult. What are the most important features defining and explaining Russia's use of normative approaches? First, my study confirms a well-articulated thesis that 'normative power' is power that is able to shape conceptions of the 'normal' (Diez, 2005, p. 615). Russia's current strategy is aimed at presenting itself as a 'normal country' whose political practices resemble those of the West. As a Russian author argues: “Putin's strategy is best understood as one of 'normal great power', which seeks to move away from Soviet-style isolationism and wants to turn Russia into a full-fledged member of the international community” (Tsygankov, 2005, p. 134). Related to this, Russia's Foreign Minister refers to a policy of pragmatism and common sense, which fits into

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<sup>36</sup> *Rossiiskaia gazeta*, 17 January 2007, p. 5.

the general tendencies of the international community. There is also a logical link between Russia's alleged normalisation and the de-politicisation of its foreign policy: it is Russia's denial of politicised practice that underpins its claims to being a 'normal country' (Lavrov, 2007), which does not need to be 'normalised' by others.

Yet at the same time, Russia has its own normative project. In relations with the EU, Russia promotes its own normative agenda (Averre, 2007, p. 1) leading to an ensuing clash of norms. The issue of norms thus transforms into a wider question relating to Russia's role in world politics. Putin is not only eager to get involved in the global normative debate, but tries to use this debate to reassert Russia's leadership. The response from Europe has been lukewarm, but nonetheless the Kremlin has neither abandoned its pro-European stance nor rushed into an alternative Eurasian ideology. As put by a Russian analyst: "[h]owever unhappy the Kremlin may be about developments in its relationship with the West, in the eyes of officials, Western Europe and the US remain the only examples of 'normal' societies" (Kagarlitsky, 2007, p. 8).

Second, and paradoxically, Russia has attempted to reassert its 'normalcy' by deconstructing the very concept of the norm. President Putin (2007b) once declared: "[c]apital punishment in some Western countries, secret prisons and tortures in Europe, troubles with mass media in certain countries, the immigration legislation not always corresponding to the established principles of international law and democratic norms – in my view, all this is related to what is considered as common values". This approach has two implications. On the one hand, it legitimises a *realpolitik* type of foreign policy, while on the other hand, it represents a meaningful normative challenge to Europe in so far as "if the state that is constituted as non-democratic ... claims to be equally democratic, then its response would be the undermining of the self's identity" (Rumelili, 2004, p. 38). In fact, Russia's strategy of denying Europe's monopoly over democracy aims at rendering its key concepts (inclusion, participation, tolerance, solidarity, etc.) 'empty signifiers' to be discursively filled by specific content in the process of debate.

Third, Russia grounds its alleged 'normalisation' in another element of de-politicised discourse – universalisation. Russia refers to a set of norms that it considers as being already universally accepted. There are two practical advantages in doing so. References to pre-existing global norms deprive Russia of any responsibility for their articulation. In addition, President Putin accepts responsibility of transforming and adapting these norms as long as their rearticulation is understood as having universal applicability. This relates to the discussions on the independence of Kosovo, which Russia links to similar problems in Transnistria, South Ossetia and Abkhazia. It is here that Russia's version of normativity reveals its decisionist, technocratic and radically apolitical nature.

In this paper, I have described several cases that might be instrumental in comparing how Russia, as opposed to the EU, articulates and implements normative arguments. A first situation arises when one side appeals to a normative argument, while the other sticks to a non-normative approach. This includes Russia's reaction to the normative challenge presented by the colour revolutions, which Moscow claims to be driven by technical/economic arguments while being widely perceived as representing hardnosed *realpolitik* by others. It also includes the Russian-Estonian dispute over the Second World War monuments in Tallinn, in which Russia claims to be driven by norms although it is viewed in Western Europe as being motivated by strategic possession goals. A second situation arises when both Russia and the EU are committed to normative arguments, but their advocated norms clash. In the Russian-Estonian conflict for example, Russia appealed to 'common values' and shared historical memories, while the EU referred to diplomatic norms and the need to ensure the safety of the Estonian Embassy in Moscow. The question is which norms should and do prevail, a question which inevitably returns to the relationship between norms and power. A third and final situation arises when there are divergent interpretations of what constitutes non-normative goals and means. For



Russia, its energy policy, while pursued at the service of Russian strategic and economic interests, is conducted within general market rules and as such cannot be deemed non-normative. Yet most Western countries interpret Russian energy policies as ruthlessly non-normative. In other words, when the interpretation of both milieu and possession goals collides, a wider space is opened to debate norms, politics and power in the international system.

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